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ABSTRACT 
As can be evidenced by the conducting of Annual Knowledge Management Conferences, 
held in Washington, DC (most recently the DoD Knowledge Management Conference, 
October 2009), DoD understands the value of Knowledge Management (KM).  The Air 
Force, Army and Navy appear to have created healthy knowledge sharing environments 
and practicing KM at mature levels; however, the Marine Corps is having a difficult time 
integrating the practice of KM into daily operations.  While the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.2 offers a methodology for how four classes of 
information should flow through the Information Hierarchy, to date, there is no 
published, standardized framework for how to adequately manage knowledge that exists 
in the Information Hierarchy, hence, the need for an actionable KM Framework that the 
Marine Corps can use to assist with current Information Management practices.  The 
focus of this thesis is to assess current KM practices across the DoD, identify KM best 
practices in industry, as well as across the DoD, and ultimately develop a KM Framework 
that will leverage the powerful dynamics of Knowledge Flow Theory to assist in bridging 
the knowledge gap in the current Marine Corps Information Hierarchy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Marine Corps Information Management is performed in accordance with Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.2, which offers a methodology for how 
four classes of information [Raw Data, Processed Data (Information), Knowledge, 
Understanding] should flow through the Information Hierarchy.  Knowledge is 
considered one of these classes of information; however, the fundamental problem is that 
knowledge is distinct from both data and information.  As demonstrated by Nissen, in 
Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics (2006), knowledge enables action, and is required at 
every level of the information hierarchy.  Currently in Marine Corps Information 
Management, knowledge is only considered "a representation of what is happening," 
(MCWP 3-40.2, 2002) and, as a result, is undervalued as an asset that can enable action at 
every level of the Information Hierarchy. 
Knowledge has been defined as, “the preeminent economic resource, more 
important than both raw material and money” (Stewart, 1997).  Considering knowledge 
as an economic output and coupling this with the knowledge-based view of the firm 
which suggests that the firm should, “focus upon knowledge as the most strategically 
important of the firm’s resources” (Grant, 1996), one comes to see the importance of 
knowledge and the potential benefits derived from managing it well.  Knowledge 
Management (KM) then, can be defined as the attempt of an organization to identify and 
distinguish knowledge from information, assess the value added of this knowledge in 
terms of actionable achievement of organizational objectives, and the pursuit of the 
appropriate amount of resource allocation to the most valuable knowledge-based assets 
throughout the organization (Nissen, 2006; Davenport et al., 1998).  Essentially, KM is 
the practice of managing intellectual capital.   
As can be evidenced by the conducting of Annual Knowledge Management 
Conferences, held in Washington, DC (most recently the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Knowledge Management Conference, October 2009), the Marine Corps, as well as DoD, 
understands well the value of KM, but has a difficult time integrating its practice into 
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daily operations.  While MCWP 3-40.2 offers a methodology for how four classes of 
information should flow through the Information Hierarchy, to date, there is no 
published, standardized framework for how to adequately manage knowledge which 
exists in the Information Hierarchy, hence the need for a KM Framework, which the 
Marine Corps could use to assist with current Information Management practices. 
Numerous projects are currently being touted as KM successes, but seemingly are 
only operational adaptations of information systems and Web 2.0 trends, that improve the 
ability of the Marine Corps and DoD to both process information faster and better link 
disparate information and data to the personnel who need it.  While these 
accomplishments are certainly valid achievements in our information-centric age of 
warfighting, they only address the abilities of Information Technology (IT) to enhance 
information flows, not knowledge flows.  Knowledge Flow Theory can assist in 
determining how and where knowledge should flow through an organization, as it leads 
one to make a distinction between data, information, and knowledge, as well as, the 
different types of knowledge required to enable timely and accurate decisions that impact 
operations.  Additionally, developing a standardized KM Framework that embraces 
Knowledge Flow Theory offers great potential to assist in the management of 
information, as well as, identify where current knowledge rests in the Information 
Management (IM) process.   
The focus of this thesis is to assess current knowledge management practices 
across the DoD, identify KM best practices in industry, as well as across the DoD, and 
ultimately develop a KM Framework that will leverage the powerful dynamics of 
Knowledge Flow Theory to assist in bridging the knowledge gap in the current Marine 
Corps Information Hierarchy. 
To identify current knowledge management practices across the DoD, and 
identify KM best practices in industry, as well as across the DoD, this research seeks to 




1.  How is the DoD currently addressing KM? 
2.  What steps are necessary for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to 
advance its KM practice? 
The following investigative questions are necessary in order to answer the above 
listed research questions: 
IQ1: What is KM? 
IQ2: What is the importance of KM to DoD? 
IQ3: Who has developed KM programs within DoD? 
IQ4: What constitutes successful KM programs? 
IQ5: What metrics are being used to evaluate KM programs? 
IQ6: How can the USMC KM practice be improved? 
The balance of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II includes a review of 
existing literature.  Chapter III discusses the research methodology.  Chapter IV 
summarizes the results.  Chapter V is a discussion of the key results and insights 
discovered during this research, and recommendations of key interventions that the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. KNOWLEDGE 
Tom Stewart (1997) asserts that knowledge is the most important factor of 
production in the modern economy.  Thus, knowledge is the key to achieving competitive 
advantage.  If we are to subscribe to this concept, then it goes without saying that we 
need to determine what exactly constitutes knowledge.  What is knowledge?  How does 
it, if at all, differ from information and data?  Can it be possessed?  How do we go about 
creating, storing, and disseminating knowledge?  All of these are key issues in being able 
to successfully manage knowledge. 
B. DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Numerous authors have attempted to define knowledge in the context of either 
organizational learning or knowledge management.  Knowledge has been defined as, “the 
preeminent economic resource, more important than both raw material and money” 
(Stewart, 1997).   Companies can achieve competitive advantage by managing 
knowledge better than their competitors.  Alavi and Leidner (2001) posit that, 
"knowledge is information possessed in the mind of individuals: it is personalized 
information (which may or may not be new, unique, useful, or accurate) related to facts, 
procedures, concepts, interpretations, ideas, observations, and judgments."  Key to this 
view is that in order to effectively distinguish between information and knowledge, one 
need not worry about the content of knowledge, how it is structured, whether it is 
accurate, or even if it is useful, because the fact that it exists in an individuals' mind 
lessens the importance of all other attributes associated with knowledge.  Additionally, 
drawing from the knowledge-based view of the firm, we have the assumption that, 
"knowledge is the critical input production and primary source of value" (Grant, 1996).  
The view here is that human productivity depends on knowledge, and further, that 
machines are, "simply embodiments of knowledge" (Grant, 1996).  Davenport and 
Holsapple (2006) state simply that knowledge is, "the capacity to take action."  This view 
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stems from the intangible assets (IA) framework put forth by Sveiby (1997), in which he 
believes that people are the only true agents in business, and further that all assets are 
merely the result of human action.  This view helps to elucidate the importance of 
intellectual capital as a management objective.  Lastly, from a DoD perspective, the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Press has put forth its own definition of 
knowledge in its publishing of, "The Knowledge Management and Information 
Technology (Know-IT Encyclopedia)."  The definition states that knowledge is, "The 
ideas, understanding, and lessons that an organization has learned over time…knowledge 
is condensed information with context that has value for decision and action" (Pollock, 
2002).  Therefore, one comes to notice that there is no clear consensus on what the 
definition of knowledge should be.  So, for the purposes of this thesis we would simply 
like to remind the reader of the widely accepted tautology of 'that which is known,' which 
can further be supported by a definition of knowledge in Webster's dictionary.  In other 
words, knowledge is the result of what is gained through the process of learning. 
C. KNOWLEDGE DISTINCTION 
To begin to grasp the understanding that knowledge is distinct from both 
information and data, one must be aware of the hierarchy of data, information, and 
knowledge.  Popular among scholars is the view that data precedes information, and 
knowledge follows information.  The implication is that knowledge is more powerful 
than both data and information as can be seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.   Knowledge Hierarchy (From Tuomi, 1999) 
Tuomi (1999) explains that in this traditional view data is structured to become 
information and that information becomes knowledge when context or meaning is added.  
Considering from the figure that yield increases as one goes up the hierarchy, the 
implication is that, "data are something less than information and that information is less 
than knowledge...Moreover, it is assumed that we first need to have data before 
information can be created, and that it is only when we have information that knowledge 
can emerge" (Tuomi, 1999).  Tuomi goes on to say that intelligence follows knowledge, 
as knowledge leads one to make certain choices.  Finally, wisdom is the result of a 
pattern of intelligent behavior. 
In addition to the knowledge hierarchy, we must also distinguish between two 
different types of knowledge:  explicit and tacit.  In a sense, the dimensions of explicit 
and tacit knowledge can be viewed as a continuum, having each on opposite ends of the 
knowledge spectrum.  Often times scholars have represented this continuum on Cartesian 
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graphs with both explicit and tacit being present on the same axis of a graph.  Generally 
speaking, explicit refers to knowledge that has been codified or captured in written form.  
Alternatively, tacit refers to knowledge that exists in one's head, or is implicitly possessed 
by an entity, and is developed over time. 
Consistent with the aforementioned view of the knowledge hierarchy we see in 
Figure 2 that the USMC has adapted a similar view of this 
hierarchy.
 
Figure 2.   USMC Information Flow (From MCWP 3-40.2) 
In the figure, we see that raw data represents pieces of information that need to be 
processed before any value can be derived.  Information comes as a result of, 
"organizing, correlating, comparing, processing, and filtering raw data and making it 
readily understandable to the potential user" (MCWP 3-40.2, 2002).  Knowledge then 
comes from a process of analysis and integration of Commander's Critical Information 
Requirements (CCIR) that have been answered.  In essence, knowledge "brings meaning 
and value and serves as a representation of what is happening" (MCWP 3-40.2, 2002).  
Ultimately, a synthesis of data, information, and knowledge occurs as the Commander 
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judges both new and already possessed knowledge, leading to the development of 
situational awareness and finally a decision on what to do with knowledge acquired.  
Once again, although different in appearance, we see that this view of information flow 
through the knowledge hierarchy is consistent with mainstream scholars and their view of 
the data, information, knowledge hierarchy and the belief that knowledge is more 
important than both data and information.  It is important to point out to the reader that 
while this view is most popular among scholars, it is not the only view.   
Nissen (2006) drawing from Tuomi (1999) discusses that of an inverted hierarchy, 
adding the concept of directionality in terms of knowledge flow.  That is to say that 
knowledge must come before information can be created which can be turned into data.  
Figure 3 illustrates this concept and helps to explain the producer/source view and its 
complementary consumer/receiver view.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Knowledge flow directionality (From Nissen, 2002a) 
The producer/source view subscribes to the inverted hierarchy view believing that 
knowledge is necessary for the production of information which is eventually turned into 
data.   The consumer/receiver view, on the other hand, takes the more traditional view 
that data comes before information and subsequently information is created from 
contextual data, which becomes knowledge when action is enabled.  Important to note is  
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that, "there is directionality to knowledge as it flows from producer or source to 
consumer or recipient" which helps to explain the coexistence of both views (Nissen, 
2006).   
D. KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEORY 
1. Knowledge Spiral  
Many models, theories, and frameworks have been used to describe how 
knowledge flows in an organization.  Nonaka and Takeuchi (1991) developed by far the 
most widely known and influential models (The Spiral of Knowledge) describing a spiral 
pattern of interactions between the tacit and explicit domains of knowledge.  Table 1 
represents this spiral of interactions as they are associated with accompanying knowledge 
flow processes. 
 
Table 1.   Knowledge spiral (After Nonaka, 1991) 
1) While tacit to tacit is most certainly not exclusive to individuals, this form of 
social activity is most often accomplished when one individual interacts and shares 
knowledge directly with another.  An operational example of this is the common 
occurrence of duty or job turnovers (when one member replaces another at a certain 
position for varying durations) in a military context.  This type of turnover is highly 
valued as one is able to imitate and practice, while getting questions answered and 
necessary feedback from the 'expert.'  Although highly valued this type of knowledge 
flow is organizationally limited as, "their knowledge never becomes explicit, and is  
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therefore not easily leveraged by the organization as a whole" (Nonaka, 1991).  In 
essence, the power leveraged remains with the individual and is not easily realized among 
the organization. 
2)  Explicit to explicit is probably the most common type of knowledge domain 
interaction as individuals fuse disparate sources of knowledge and information together 
either physically or electronically to come up with new knowledge.  Once again, the 
knowledge base of the individual grows but that of the organization remains untouched or 
generally non-extended. 
3)  Nonaka (1991) argues that when tacit and explicit interact something powerful 
happens.  He goes on to explain that the one who possesses the knowledge is able to, 
"articulate the foundations of their tacit knowledge, thereby converting it into explicit 
knowledge, allowing it to be shared" with the organization (Nonaka, 1991).  This view is 
complementary to that of Nissen (2006) in which he states that, "the sticky nature of tacit 
knowledge is a mixed blessing…on one hand, it supports competitive advantage; on the 
other, it restricts knowledge flows within one's own organization."  Because tacit 
knowledge is based upon experience, time, and is so difficult to articulate, being able to 
convert this knowledge into explicit form makes the knowledge readily available and 
easy to transfer, as its ability to be duplicated becomes infinitesimal in degree. 
4)  Explicit to tacit is synonymous with the development of new tacit knowledge 
based upon knowledge that has been shared in explicit form.  As Nonaka puts it, "as new 
explicit knowledge is shared throughout an organization, one begins to broaden, extend, 
and reframe their own tacit knowledge" (Nonaka, 1991).  Simply put, "where knowledge 
flows, learning takes place" (Nissen, 2006). 
2. Knowledge Flow Strategy 
Ribiere and Roman (2006) describe knowledge flows through an agreed upon 
typology that defines two strategies for knowledge flows:  codification vs. 
personalization.  Through independent research studies the authors attempt to discern, 
“how people obtain and/or share the knowledge that they need to perform their work” 
(Ribiere and Roman, 2006).  In today’s information-centric age of operations many 
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organizations rely heavily upon the use of information technology.  Here is where the 
codification strategy is employed most often, as its main purpose is to collect and 
disseminate knowledge and information throughout the organization.  According to 
Davenport and Prusak (1998), “the aim of codification is to put organizational knowledge 
into a form that makes it accessible to those who need it.  It literally turns knowledge into 
a code (though not necessarily a computer code) to make it as organized, explicit, 
portable, and easy to understand as possible.”  The codification strategy is generally 
employed in a fashion where knowledge is stored in databases (disparate and/or 
centralized) where it is accessed most often using the ‘people-to-document approach.’  In 
other words, knowledge is extracted from individuals who possess it, made explicit in 
form, and disseminated for the purposes of reuse.  In contrast, the personalization strategy 
focuses on leveraging relationships and building networks for people to share their tacit 
knowledge.  Undoubtedly this strategy can be approached with the use of the computer as 
well; however not in the same fashion as the ‘people to document approach’, as the focus 
is, “on dialogue between individuals as opposed to knowledge in a database” (Ribiere and 
Roman, 2006).  Collaborative technologies are often used to support the sharing of 
knowledge.  Zack and Michael (1996) discuss collaborative technologies as they support 
the personalization approach highlighting that,  
in contrast to distributive applications, the repository associated with 
collaborative applications is a by-product of the interaction, rather than the 
primary focus of the application.  This repository of messages is dynamic 
and its content emergent.  The ability to capture and structure emergent 
communication within a repository provides a more valuable, enduring, 
and leverageable knowledge by-product than the personal notes or 
memories of a traditional conversation or meeting.  Collaboration 
technologies, therefore, can support a well-structured repository of explicit 
knowledge while enabling the management of tacit knowledge. (Zack and 
Michael, 1996) 
The results of this study, highlighting findings of the government, for-profit, and 
nonprofit sectors will be discussed later in this chapter, as we discuss Information 
Technology (IT) and its place in KM practice, as it has the potential to help confer 
competitive advantages to those who employ it appropriately. 
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3. Knowledge Flow Visualization 
Nissen (2002, 2005) extends Nonaka's model from that of two dimensions to a 
four dimensional model better enabling us to visualize knowledge flow patterns.  The two 
dimensions presented by Nonaka are 1) the explicit-tacit distinction, which Nissen (2006) 
refers to as one dimension known simply as explicitness; and 2) ontological, again more 
simply defined by Nissen (2006) as reach, thereby identifying levels of social interaction 
as can be seen in the knowledge flow process column of Table 1.  The additional two 
dimensions extended by Nissen include life cycle and flow time.  As stated in his text, 
"life cycle refers to the kind of activity (e.g., creation, sharing, application) associated 
with knowledge flows; and flow time pertains to the length of time (e.g., minutes, days, 
years) required for knowledge to move from one person, organization, place, or time to 




Figure 4.   Multidimensional knowledge-flow visualization (From Nissen, 2005) 
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In Figure 4,  we see all four dimensions come together, "to visualize a 
representative knowledge flow from this well-known theory" (Nissen, 2006).  Starting at 
coordinate A, we have tacit knowledge created by an individual.  As the socialization 
process occurs we move from A to B which is representative of tacit knowledge being 
shared among a group.  As explained earlier, this knowledge has potentially more power 
but is hard to capitalize on until it can be converted into an explicit form.  This leads us to 
coordinate C, where the externalization process occurs as we move towards explicit 
knowledge that has been formulated by a group.  Up to this point we can see that the 
vectors used to delineate knowledge flows have been relatively bold or heavy signifying 
the long (slow) flow time associated with each knowledge flow process.  Also, key to 
point out here is the association with Table 1, as we see that the movement from tacit to 
explicit has covered the two knowledge flow processes of socialization and articulation 
from the knowledge spiral as adapted from Nonaka (1991).  Moving from coordinate C to 
D, we end up at explicit knowledge that has been organized by the organization.  This 
particular knowledge flow process has occurred relatively fast as can be seen by the 
narrow vector representing short flow time.  This process of knowledge combination is 
synonymous with the knowledge spiral process of synthesizing.  The speed associated 
with this process can be explained by the nature of explicit knowledge, which is 
relatively easy to articulate and transfer when compared to that of tacit knowledge.  
Finally, moving from coordinate D to E we see the culmination of numerous codified 
products that have been internalized by individuals throughout the organization leading to 
the development of tacit, organizational knowledge that is being refined, which is the 
main ingredient for innovation and the creation of new knowledge, as opposed to simply 
knowledge reuse which is the current state of knowledge management in many of today’s 
organizations.  It is here we feel knowledge flow theory can make its biggest contribution 
to knowledge management practices as the theory can assist in determining how and 
where knowledge should flow through an organization, as it leads one to make a 
distinction between data, information, and knowledge, as well as, the different types of 
knowledge required to enable timely and accurate decisions that impact operations.  This  
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thesis will present more knowledge flow visualizations as we examine future case studies 
and summarize our findings of knowledge flow pathologies and recommend interventions 
on how knowledge flow issues can be addressed. 
E. KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY 
IT is pretty much commonplace now among KM initiatives.  As more and more 
organizations turn to IT to be the ‘silver bullet,’ it becomes imperative for us to have an 
understanding of the knowledge life cycle and how IT interacts in both supportive and 
performative ways.  For this, we will examine the knowledge life cycle as presented by 
Nissen (2006), discussing how some forms of IT support KM better than others, Alavi 
and Leidner (2001), which introduces a framework for the analysis of the role of an 
information system in organizational knowledge management processes, and the study 
performed by Ribiere and Roman (2006), in which government, for-profit, and nonprofit 
organizations were analyzed to determine what types of technology applications were 
used by people to obtain and share knowledge, as well as perform their daily duties. 
Nissen warns that, “information technology is helpful and necessary but not 
sufficient for knowledge to flow” (Nissen, 2006).  KM is about people, processes, and 
technology.  It is imperative for any KM initiative to be approached in terms of all three 
in order for knowledge to properly flow.  Much of the reason for this warning about 
technology is due to the fact that certain types of knowledge are supported by IT better 
than other types of knowledge. 
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Figure 5.   Knowledge life cycle (From Nissen et al., 2000) 
As seen in Figure 5, there are two different classes of knowledge; that of the 
localized view in which its three knowledge activities share the quality of being 
supported well by IT, and the expanded view with its three knowledge activities sharing 
the characteristic of being supported well by people who perform the activities and not so 
much by IT.  Just as in the multidirectional knowledge flow diagram the life cycle here 
begins with knowledge creation and ends with knowledge refinement; however, the life 
cycle is not limited to flowing in a single direction. 
Examples of supportive technologies for the localized view of the life cycle are 
repositories for building knowledge maps or networks in the organization phase, Web 
sites that house bodies of knowledge and cater to communities of interest/practice for the 
purposes of knowledge formalization, and the relatively new use of Web 2.0 technologies 
used during the sharing phase to help distribute knowledge to individuals both locally and 
those in remote locations.  The expanded view has the application phase in which people 
are necessary for decision making.  Automation systems are helpful in this phase, but 
most humans seem to have an inherent distrust of technology when it comes to making 
decisions.  Knowledge refinement generally applies to an individual’s internalization of 
 17
some form of explicit knowledge, thereby turning it into personal tacit knowledge.  
Again, IT generally does not support this phase well.  Finally, as mentioned earlier, the 
notion is that knowledge is something that exists in the minds of people; therefore, IT has 
a very limited role in this refinement phase as well.  Hence, “most IT plays a supportive 
role in the organization, whereas people play most of the performative roles” (Nissen, 
2006).  The only caveat to this principle is found through the use of simulation 
technology which offers a “trial and error approach to learning,” thereby accomplishing 
learning “without having to bear the consequences of faulty decisions,” consequently 
“facilitating learning as well as doing through virtual practice,” allowing it to be 
employed during multiple phases of the knowledge life cycle (Nissen, 2006). 
According to Alavi and Leidner (2001), in order to formulate a knowledge 
management strategy, organizations need to assess and understand their knowledge 
position and existing intellectual resources before they can assess the role of information 
technology in facilitating knowledge management.  Building on the view of organizations 
as “social collectives and knowledge systems,” the authors developed a framework for 
analyzing the role of an information system (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).  The four 
knowledge processes comprising the framework include 1) creation; 2) storage/retrieval; 
3) transfer; and 4) application.  The following table summarizes well each of the four 
processes and the potential role IT could serve in each. 
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Table 2.   Knowledge Management Processes and the Potential Role of IT (After Alavi and 
Leidner, 2001) 
1. Knowledge Creation 
The authors, drawing from (Pentland, 1995) posit that knowledge creation 
involves developing new content or replacing existing content within the organization’s 
tacit and explicit knowledge.  In essence, knowledge creation is both a social process 
which includes activities like sharing and collaboration, as well as a personal activity 
involving internalization of existing knowledge and development of new tacit knowledge 
as a result of new insight.  This view is in concert with Nonaka’s knowledge spiral.  It 
matches succinctly the four modes of knowledge creation discussed by (Nonaka, 1994): 
socialization, externalization, internalization, and combination.  IT capable of  
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accelerating the growth of knowledge creation include, “systems designed for support of 
collaboration, coordination, and communication processes,” email, and intranets (Alavai 
and Leidner, 2001).   
2. Knowledge Storage/Retrieval 
In terms of knowledge storage/retrieval, Alavi and Leidner discuss the concept of 
organizational memory which includes, “knowledge residing in various component 
forms, including written documentation, structured information stored in electronic 
databases, codified human knowledge stored in expert systems, documented 
organizational procedures and processes and tacit knowledge acquired by individuals and 
networks of individuals” (Tan et al., 1999).  In addition to the types of IT listed in Table 
2 that help to support knowledge storage/retrieval, computer storage technologies 
coupled with sophisticated retrieval algorithms and techniques (e.g., SQL), and also 
database management systems can be used to help alleviate the problem of organizational 
memory loss. 
3. Knowledge Transfer 
Knowledge transfer is arguably the most important of the four processes in terms 
of knowledge flows.  As stated by the authors, “transfer occurs at various levels: transfers 
of knowledge between individuals, from individuals to explicit sources, from individuals 
to groups, between groups, between groups, across groups, and from the group to the 
organization” (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).  The most important aspect of this phenomenon 
is that knowledge gets transferred to those who need it, when they need it, regardless of 
their physical location. Literature abounds on this topic of knowledge transfer and Gupta 
and Govindarajan (2000) have popularly conceptualized it in terms of five elements: “1) 
perceived value of the source unit’s knowledge, 2) motivational disposition of the source 
(i.e., their willingness to share knowledge), 3) existence and richness of transmission 
channels, 4) motivational disposition of the receiving unit (i.e., their willingness to 
acquire knowledge from the source), and 5) the absorptive capacity of the receiving unit, 
defined as the ability not only to acquire and assimilate but also to use knowledge.”  
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Because knowledge and technology is the focus of this section, we want to hone in here 
on the importance of element 3: the existence and richness of transmission channels.   
There are formal and informal, as well as personal and impersonal types of 
transfer channels.  Informal mechanisms include the likes of unscheduled meetings, 
informal seminars, or just conversations between individuals that may happen on a coffee 
break.  While results of these informal meetings can be effective in terms of socialization, 
they prove quite ineffective in ability to transfer knowledge, mainly because the 
knowledge being created and shared is not formally coded.  Because of this, there is no 
real way to ensure that the knowledge gets transferred from one individual to others who 
may need the same knowledge.  More formal mechanisms include training sessions and 
planned tours, which do well at knowledge distribution/sharing, however, they 
dangerously lack any real creativity since most presentations are quite standardized for 
delivery.  Personal channels such as apprenticeships or military personnel turnovers are 
effective at distributing context specific knowledge, whereas impersonal channels such as 
knowledge repositories are most effective at transferring generalized knowledge.   
As stated by Alavi and Leidner (2001), IT can support all four forms of 
knowledge transfer, but it has mostly been applied to two types: informal (e.g., Lotus 
Notes discussion databases) and impersonal (e.g., knowledge maps and corporate 
directories).  Other forms of IT that contribute to knowledge transfer are that of 
intelligent agent software utilized to help develop interest profiles of members of an 
organization, and are then used to link interested members of similar topics; video 
technologies which can be utilized to provide visual images of some sort of tacit 
knowledge that is either difficult to articulate, or simply better understood if seen as 
opposed to being read; and social media which helps to harness the power of knowledge 
organizations which are characterized by, “weak hierarchies, dense lateral connections, 
low departmental walls, and openness to the environment” (Achrol and Philip, 1999).  
Even an organization without all the characteristics of a knowledge organization can 
excel in knowledge transfer through the use of social media as it can, “increase 
knowledge transfer by extending the individual’s reach beyond the formal 
communication lines” (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). 
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In further relation to social media and knowledge transfer via knowledge 
management, work Done by Cross, Parker, Prusak, and Borgatti (2001) identifies four 
dimensions of network ties which influence a firm’s KM capability: 
1) Knowledge: “knowing what someone else knows” when managers face 
a problem or opportunity; 2) Access: being able to contact and secure 
useful information for an actor in a timely fashion; 3) Engagement: the 
expert understands the problem as experienced by the seeker and then 
adapts his or her knowledge to the needs of the person information; and 4) 
Safety: ease in admitting a lack of knowledge. 
The point is that carefully constructed organizational implementations of social 
media can help to extend mechanisms for formal and personal transfer channels through 
the use of IT, thereby extending networks, increasing communication channels, and 
providing near real-time access to knowledge resources, which is substantially faster than 
more traditional forms of supporting IT. 
4. Knowledge Application 
Rounding off the author’s framework for analyzing of the role of an information 
system in organizational knowledge management processes, Alavi and Leidner (2001) 
posit that “IT can enhance knowledge integration and application by facilitating the 
capture, updating, and accessibility of organizational directives, codifying and 
automating organizational routines, and capturing and enforcing well specified 
organizational procedures.”  Examples of this can be seen in the publishing of corporate 
intranets in which more open access and document controls to corporate directives is 
given to employees; in the use of workflow automation systems that increase efficiency 
of workflows by decreasing communication and coordination which was formerly 
necessary among workers; and rule-based expert systems that allow the enforcement of 




Figure 6.   TNT 10-2 CBR Example (From Duke, Hayward, Johnson, 2010) 
During a Tactical Network Testbed (TNT) experiment aboard the Naval 
Postgraduate School campus, during the winter quarter of 2010, our team continued to 
identify a repeating scenario during our exercise in which new users (computers) were 
attempting to connect to a network we were managing utilizing the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP).  The figure illustrates a CBR approach to solving this 
recurring network management problem in which a rule-based expert system could be 
employed.  Specifically:  
1- The new case being presented is a random user attempting to connect to a 
network that we are managing. 
2- The “If rule” is whether or not the device is SNMP enabled, and we go into our 
Case Library to see if a similar case exists? 
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3 – A similar case does exist, and we simply adapt that SNMP Case and move to 
execute what was previously done in this situation.  In our case, the individual is made to 
configure the device for SNMP before being allowed to connect to the network. 
4 – Finally, our case is archived and stored in the Case Library. 
Here we see the power of an expert system that has essentially automated the 
archival and enforcement of well specified organizational rules. 
Having reviewed the knowledge life cycle and discussing different technologies 
that support various forms of knowledge, we turn back to the Ribiere and Roman (2006) 
paper, in which government, for-profit, and nonprofit organizations were analyzed to 
determine what types of technology applications were used by people to obtain and share 
knowledge, as well as perform their daily duties.  Recalling the knowledge flow 
strategies of codification and personalization outlined in the article, the following figure 
shows the results of strategic approaches taken by each sector. 
 
Figure 7.   Codification and personalization factors as dominant strategic approaches for 
the flow of knowledge within the organization (From Ribiere and Roman, 2006) 
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The government sector and non-profit sector appear to be polar opposites as the 
emphasis of government users in predominantly codification at 59%, implying mainly the 
use of IT resources such as intranet/extranets, search engines, and information retrieval 
systems for knowledge flow, as opposed to non-profit workers preferring personalization 
at 54%, signifying less formal and explicit means of knowledge flow such as phone calls, 
teleconferencing, working groups, and communities of practice, thereby relying more on 
relationships and network formulation for knowledge to flow among members.  Hansen 
et al. (1999) note that organizations are more effective when they emphasize only one of 
the strategies.  The implication is that those trying to excel at both, risk failure at both.  
This postulation is seemingly true as the government and non-profit sectors respondents 
employing both are at 8% and 6% respectively.  The for-profit sectors indicate that 
employment of each strategy is roughly split down the middle at 49% each, with only 3% 
of respondents indicating a balanced approach.  Figure 7D depicts all three sectors 
combined. 
While ultimately, the approach chosen depends heavily upon the strategy of the 
organization, it can be seen that results from this study present a sort of continuum in 
which the government and non-profit sectors are at opposite ends of the spectrum with 
the for-profit sector sitting in the middle.  The data indicates that organizations realize the 
necessity of both approaches. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the three views of knowledge technology 
presented by Nissen (2006), Alavi and Leidner (2001), and Ribiere and Roman (2006) all 
complement each other.  Nissen presents the knowledge life cycle in localized and 
extended views, emphasizing the ability of IT to contribute well to various stages of the 
life cycle.  Alavi and Leidner present a framework that shows the knowledge life cycle in 
four different KM processes, subsequently showing how IT can both support and enable 
each of the four KM processes.  Finally, Ribiere and Roman present knowledge flows in 
the form of two differing strategies of KM: codification vs. personalization, each 
encompassing elements of the knowledge life cycle, while also illustrating the forms of 
IT utilized to accomplish and perform tasks related to each strategy. 
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F. USMC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (IM)/KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
1. Information Management 
The Information Management Program at every level of USMC command is 
utilized to facilitate the decision making of the Commander.  Information Managers are 
responsible for providing a "timely flow of relevant information" to the Commander that 
assists him/her in anticipating and understanding changing conditions and their impact on 
operations (MCWP 3-40.2).  Knowledge is in essence, acquired from many sources of 
information and data, in an attempt to ensure the information's accuracy.  While multiple 
sources of information can improve accuracy, as well as, reduce errors, the reverse effect 
of information overload inevitably develops.  Knowledge, which enables action, is what 
is needed, but not addressed in our current management of information.  Undoubtedly, 
knowledge is important in this process, as it helps to lead the commander to the 
understanding that is necessary for sound decision-making. 
The Marine Corps, pulling from the SECNAVINST 5000.36A, has defined IM as, 
“the planning, budgeting, manipulation and controlling of information throughout its life 
cycle.  IM allows the Marine Corps to gather, share and learn from information and is 
focused on providing the right information at the right time in an understandable and 
useable format to enable decision making.”  The Information Management Officer (IMO) 
currently works with each staff section to create an Information Management Plan (IMP) 
that, “identifies procedures used to facilitate the delivery of quality information to those 
who need it in a format they can quickly understand” (MCWP 3-40.2).  The decision 
making process of the commander is heavily influenced by the Plan, Decide, Execute, 
and Assess (PDE&A) cycle.  It is during the planning phase of the operation that planned 
decisions are made which are to be carried out during the execution phase.  Decision 
points result from these planned decisions that help to identify points in time or space 
where a commander expects he/she will have to make a decision.  Tools used to support 
these processes are the decision support matrix (DSM) and the decision support template 
(DST) which lists the decision points previously identified.  Marines are merely one 
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component helping to fight the single battle, and thus it is imperative that IM procedures 
enable the Corps to share critical and relevant information in support of joint, combined, 
and multinational operations.  Ultimately USMC IM products, replete with relevant and 
comprehensible information are what are used to feed the common operational picture 
(COP) of joint and component commanders, helping them to maintain situational 
awareness, while controlling and dictating the tempo of operations against our 
adversaries. 
2. Knowledge Management 
The Marine Corps realizes the importance of KM and its potential to assist in the 
creation, storing, and dissemination of required knowledge, as can be evidenced by its 
working group of knowledge workers who meet annually at United States Marine Corps 
Information Management/Knowledge Management Conference.  Unfortunately, the 
Marine Corps struggles with assigning Knowledge Managers to units due to limited 
resources.  Additionally, as the Corps attempts to embrace KM, each unit is left to 
develop its own practices of KM because of the lack of a standardized USMC KM 
Framework. 
Pulling from the Department of the Navy Knowledge Management Strategy, KM 
is defined as, “the integration of people and processes, enabled by technology, to 
facilitate the exchange of operationally relevant information and expertise to increase 
organizational performance.”  Defense Acquisition University has defined KM as, “the 
process for effectively applying intellectual capital (human, social, and organizational) to 
enable faster, better organizational decisions” (Pollock, 2002).  While the definitions may 
vary, the implications are the same.  KM has the capability to make USMC business and 
decision making processes better.   
Research shows that the Corps is actively participating in various KM initiatives.  
To date, USMC KM initiatives appear to remain unit specific, as opposed to 
organizationally formalized.  A standardized USMC KM framework will assist in 
providing USMC units with operationally relevant, industry and DoD-centric KM best 
practices and tools with which to make use of in their process of developing unit-level 
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KM strategies.  Examples of the types of operations and kinds of missions that are 
relevant to knowledge and knowledge flows span the gamete to include: 1) joint task 
force operations in which a high level of situational awareness understanding is necessary 
for appropriate expeditionary warfare maneuvers to occur from ship to shore, 2) 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions in which hastily formed 
international military and diplomatic relationships and rapid decision making processes 
determine success or failure in getting necessary relief to those in need, 3) knowledge 
sharing among a small contingent of military defense lawyers significantly dispersed 
geographically around the globe that have a common mission of supporting  more than 
202,000 Marines, 4) in place combat turnovers of Marine units, 5) collaboration among 
communities of practice members, and 6) stopping the loss of organizational knowledge 
due to contract expirations and retirements.  While the above listed scenarios are not all 
inclusive, they certainly provide us with a broad enough spectrum of KM oriented 
processes with which we can safely postulate that a KM framework for the Marine Corps 
should assist top leaders in their institutionalization of the discipline and further 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Yin (2009) states that, "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."  The practice of 
KM is certainly a contemporary phenomenon (observable occurrence) that is absolutely 
abstract in nature, making it quite difficult to place in one context.  Its practice is varied 
and its existence universal, both making any meaningful research of its topic most 
appropriately accomplished through the lens of case study. 
The case study research method utilized for this thesis is intended to contribute to 
our knowledge of organizational knowledge management at both the unit and service 
levels of DoD, thereby, applying its findings toward development of a KM framework to 
be utilized by the USMC.  The multiple cases being studied are both historical and 
contemporary in nature, and no possibility exists for the behavior of events studied to be 
manipulated.  The comparative studies presented are exploratory, developing hypotheses 
and propositions; and also explanatory, "dealing with operational links needing to be 
traced over time," yet allowing one to draw relevant conclusions for contemporary 
practitioners (Yin, 2009). 
A. COMPONENTS OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
Yin (2009) identifies five necessary components of case study research: 1) a 
study's questions; 2) its propositions, if any; 3) its unit(s) of analysis; 4) the logic linking 
the data to the propositions; and 5) the criteria for interpreting the findings. 
Component one of this research is accomplished with the formulation of the 
following two research questions, "How is the DoD currently addressing KM?" and 
"What steps are necessary for the Marine Corps to advance its KM practice?"  The 
exploratory nature of question one is intended to advance extant research on the practice 
of KM throughout DoD.  Through the analysis of service-level KM education programs, 
documented unit-level KM practices, and both unit and service-level information portals 
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this research seeks to answer the first research question.  The explanatory nature of 
question two guides this research through the identification and analysis of past and 
current successful DoD KM initiatives which allows for triangulation of observations and 
findings, leading to insight towards the development of a KM framework capable of 
guiding USMC KM practitioners. 
The investigative questions developed leads to propositions (component two) put 
forth by this research, namely:  Proposition 1:  KM is operationally defined throughout 
DoD based upon each service's mission, thereby having implications as to how each 
service practices the discipline; Proposition 2:  KM is important to the DoD and the DoD 
gains benefits from its practice; Proposition 3:  KM practice has continuously evolved 
throughout the DoD; Proposition 4:  The civilian sector and the DoD community is 
replete with examples of successful KM initiatives; Proposition 5:  Metrics for evaluating 
KM initiatives, if existent, are varied throughout DoD; and Proposition 6:  KM practice in 
the Marine Corps can be improved with the advancement of an organizational framework 
to be utilized by USMC knowledge workers.  Research data gathered and realized will 
support or refute the above listed propositions. 
The third component, unit(s) of analysis, is extremely important as it helps to 
define the cases to be studied.  This research puts forth two units of analysis; that of unit-
level KM initiatives and service-level KM initiatives. 
The fourth component of the linking of logic to data will be accomplished by 
utilizing the (type 4) multiple-case (embedded) design.  Each of the four services will 
serve as a single case with the two previously mentioned units of analysis embedded in 
each case.  The strength of this comparative study will rest in the theoretical replications 
across each service while complemented by the literal replications known to exist within 
each service. 
Drawing from Yin (2009), this study accomplishes the fifth component of 
interpreting a study's findings through pattern matching and logic modeling.  The 
theoretical propositions that led to our research questions is relied upon to shape the  
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collection of our data which will be organized in a collection database.  This method 
allows for the highlighting of unit and service-level similarities and divergences from 
which conclusions can be drawn and verified. 
B. QUALITY AND RELIABILITY METRICS 
Just as with any other type of research design the logical statements put forth by 
case study research should have its quality evaluated according to certain logical tests.  
The following table summarizes four tests that are common to any empirical social 
research along with the associated tactics necessary at each phase of research to ensure 
success. 
 
Table 3.   Case Study Tactics for Four Design Test (After Yin, 2009) 
 
Construct validity seeks to, "identify correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied" (Yin, 2009).  This research establishes construct validity by 
making extensive use of multiple sources of evidence.  Data collection has ensured a 
wide array of theoretical and DoD specific documents for support of conceptual study.  
Internal validity refers to the establishment of causal relationships and the ability to 
distinguish relationships caused by outside factors not dealt with by the research.  
Secondly, in terms of internal validity, there is the concern of incorrect inferences being 
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made from events not directly observed.  Numerous inferences will be made by this 
research.  Through pattern matching and logic modeling of KM best practices across 
DoD, internal validity is maintained as findings are appropriately replicated at the unit 
and service-levels of DoD.  External validity is mainly concerned with the problem of, 
"knowing whether a study's findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study" 
(Yin, 2009).  Once again, replication logic in this research ensures that the focus remains 
on that of general findings of unit and service-level military organizations.  Finally, 
reliability ensures that errors and biases are minimized.  The use of the case study 
database helps to prevent any bias concerns with this research and the minimization of 
errors ensures that another investigator can use the same research procedures in repeating 
a case study on the same case, and arrive at the same conclusions (Yin, 2009). 
C. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND BIASES 
The major bias of this research is that the investigator is a member of the United 
States Marine Corps.  The relation of findings to collected data, in addition to rigorous 
analysis mitigates this bias to the maximum extent possible.  A significant limitation of 
this study is that the term "KM" has no universally accepted definition.  Consequently, 
many looking to draw inferences and conclusions will differ in agreements and 
expectations due to varying practices of KM across the DoD, as well as the differing 
relations of KM benefits to each service based upon that service's mission requirements 
and mission capabilities.  Another limitation to this research is that no data is collected by 
means of observations, interviews, or surveys from current DoD KM practitioners.  
However, the documents collected, tools evaluated, and Web portals visited are the most 
current in publication and use by DoD KM practitioners, thereby increasing the validity 
of inferences made and findings reached which mitigates further the limitations 







Net-centricity is a buzz-word throughout DoD today.  It implies that through 
networking, DoD will be able to link components of the Department, as well as 
organizations within with "complementary core competencies" that will enable the Total 
Force to become more than the sum of its parts (NDS, 2008).  The goal of net-centricity 
is to, "break down barriers and transform industrial-era organizational structures into an 
information and knowledge-based enterprise" (NDS, 2008).  Thus this transformation to a 
net-centric force requires "fundamental changes in processes, policy, and culture," all of 
which KM boasts significant abilities to achieve.  Are current DoD KM initiatives 
contributing to this transformation?  The answer to that question rests in the 
successfulness of the initiatives undertaken.  
Davenport et al. (1998) study 31 knowledge management projects in 24 
companies, and identify four indicators of success, in addition to eight critical success 
factors for KM projects.  The following table summarizes each of the indicators of 
success and the critical success factors.  Reflected in the table also is the identification of 
the four factors that seemingly matter the most, as indicated by their being underlined. 
 
Table 4.   Indicators and Factors of Successful KM Projects (from Davenport et al., 
1998) 
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The indicators and factors of success listed above played a large role in the 
development of the investigative questions and propositions presented in this study.  
While there is no absolute delineation of each of our questions to a particular success 
indicator or factor, the spirit of specific indicators or factors can be traced to each 
question asked.  Additionally, while Davenport et al. attempt to prioritize factors by 
identifying those underlined, this study does not hold the same position, but merely 
analyzes DoD KM initiatives to see which factors may be present, further indicating their 
propensity for being considered successful.  
This multiple case design focuses on each of the four armed services as a single 
case with two units of analysis embedded in each case: 1) unit-level KM initiatives; and 
2) service-level KM initiatives.  The chapter is subdivided by sections that correspond to 
each of the investigative questions posed in Chapter I.  The investigative questions from 
Chapter I, leads to the necessity to answer the following propositions put forth in Chapter 
III:  
Proposition 1: KM is operationally defined throughout DoD based upon each 
service's mission, thereby having implications as to how each service practices the 
discipline;  
Proposition 2: KM is important to the DoD and the DoD gains benefits from its 
practice;  
Proposition 3: KM practice has continuously evolved throughout the DoD;  
Proposition 4: The civilian sector and the DoD community is replete with 
examples of successful KM initiatives;  
Proposition 5: Metrics for evaluating KM initiatives, if existent, are varied 
throughout DoD; and  
Proposition 6: KM practice in the Marine Corps can be improved with the 
advancement of an organizational framework to be utilized by USMC knowledge 
workers.    
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All data collected comes by analysis of service-level KM education programs, 
documented unit-level KM practices, and both unit and service-level information portals.  
The data is then weighed against the indicators of success and critical success factors 
mentioned above to reach collective conclusions.  Additionally, where applicable, we 
append knowledge flow principles developed by Nissen (2006) to evaluate knowledge 
flow health and identify potential knowledge flow pathologies among DoD KM 
initiatives. 
A. WHAT IS KM? 
In the DoD IM/IT Strategic Plan of 2008–2009, the DoD CIO defines KM as "the 
systematic process of discovering, selecting, organizing, distilling, sharing, developing 
and using information, ...providing the basis from which decisions are made and actions 
are taken."  This definition was developed with the help of each service's CIO.  In light of 
this seemingly joint-like process, we want to see how each service defines KM, and 
whether or not it is in concert with the DoD Strategic Plan.  Likewise, defining KM leads 
us to posit that an operational definition of KM is in concert with critical success factor 5 
in table 4; presenting a clear language and purpose for the initiative. 
1. Air Force 
“Knowledge Management (KM)—The handling, directing, governing, or 
controlling of natural knowledge processes (acquire/validate, produce, transfer/integrate 
knowledge) within an organization in order to achieve the goals and objectives of the 
organization (JP 6-0). KM seeks to make the best use of the knowledge that is available 
to an organization, creating new knowledge, and increasing awareness and understanding 
in the process. KM can also be defined as the capturing, organizing, and storing of 
knowledge and experiences of individual workers and groups within an organization and 
making this information available to others in the organization” (AFPD 33-3, 2006). 
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2. Army 
“Knowledge Management (KM) supports the creation, organization, application 
and transfer of knowledge to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. It 
is a structured approach to transfer Soldier experiential knowledge in order to give 
commanders and Soldiers a major tactical advantage on the battlefield” (AR 25-1, 2005). 
3.     Marines 
“Knowledge Management (KM) is defined in reference (f) as the integration of 
people and processes, enabled by technology, to facilitate the exchange of operationally 
relevant information and expertise to increase organizational performance.  This 
operational function, advocated by Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC), enables organizational learning to improve mission performance” (MCO 
5400.52, 2010). 
4.     Navy 
Knowledge Management, as defined by the DON CIO, is the integration 
of people and processes, enabled by technology, to facilitate the exchange 
of operationally relevant information and expertise to increase 
organizational performance. 
DON KM has Four Initiatives:   
1.Broaden awareness  
2.Broad implementation 
3.Proliferate KM lessons learned 
4.Build new implementation programs and share KM resources 
 Two levels:  
1.Enterprise-wide process improvement  
2.Day-to-day operations at the command level (Memo, DON KM 
Strategy, 2005) 
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Davenport et al. (1998) state that, "knowledge managers must address the 
language issue in a way that fits their culture."  They go on to imply that those companies 
that avoid the language issue go on to experience difficulty with their KM efforts because 
the culture of the organization never accepts that KM deals with complexity and 
uncertainty.  This definition for the Air Force certainly presents clear language, and most 
importantly it provides a purpose for this initiative.  The definition is in concert with the 
DoD Strategic Plan, and it shows that KM is to be utilized to accomplish organizational 
objectives.  The definition provided seems to focus more on organizational processes and 
less on unit-level implementations.  It is broad in nature but seems to effectively 
communicate the objectives while addressing the language problem head on.  The Army 
definition is clear, concise and provides an objective for its KM initiative(s).  The 
definition appears to be in concert with the DoD Strategic Plan especially in its 
discussion of facilitating decision making and gaining a tactical advantage.  The Marine 
Corps, unlike the other services, does not provide its own definition of KM, rather it 
adopts the definition of the Navy.  While upon first appearance this seems to show less of 
a perceived importance with KM adoption by the Marine Corps, it is elaborated on in the 
Marine Corps Order that the Director, Command, Control, Computers, and 
Communication (C4), who serves as the Marine Corps CIO, is also the DoN Deputy CIO 
Marine Corps, and reports directly to the DoN CIO.  With this understanding, we find 
that KM holds no less importance to the Marine Corps with regard to the other services, 
only that there seemingly lacks a necessity to have to reinvent the wheel and redefine a 
concept that has been already defined well by the Navy, and the other branches of 
service.  The definition provided by the Navy is by far, the most comprehensive provided 
by all of the services with its discussion of integrating KM practices with technology for 
the purpose of exchanging operationally relevant information and expertise (knowledge) 
across the organization.  While the language issue does not seem to be addressed by the 
Navy, as warned by Davenport et al. (1998) stating, "normal business language gives the 
impression of being fact based, often drawing on military and natural science metaphors," 
the strategy for implementation laid out by the Navy is actionable, believable, 
understandable, and most importantly able to be carried out, as it articulates four 
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initiatives and two levels of implementation.  The Navy strategy with its "centralized 
vision and decentralized execution" should enable it to overcome any perceived cultural 
issues associated with its avoidance of abstract language associated with KM in its 
definition. 
Nissen (2006) states that, "Culture, trust, and incentives affect organizational 
learning, hence, performance as much as process, technology, and training do."  Of the 
four definitions provided above which states each service's purpose for pursuing KM 
initiatives, we see that only the Navy seems to address issues involving organizational 
learning in its articulation of a robust KM strategy.  While definition alone is not enough 
to make a conjecture about a service's KM strategy, the effort put forth by the Navy to 
explain its strategy upfront goes a long way toward developing a knowledge-friendly 
culture (critical success factor 4), making it easily understood at both the organizational 
and unit levels, how KM will be practiced.  Defining KM organizationally is extremely 
important, as it sets the tone throughout the organization as to whether the initiatives are 
exploratory and potentially short-lived in nature, or if the efforts are truly intended to be 
culture changing and organizationally embedded.  In short, this study cannot conclude 
that defining KM is mission-oriented, or whether or not how they define KM, positively 
or negatively affects how the services are practicing KM.  However, later in this study we 
see how decentralized efforts at KM adoption are absolutely mission-oriented. 
B.     WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF KM TO DOD? 
The DoD IM/IT Strategic Plan of (2008–2009) deems information as a strategic 
asset and goes on to articulate that we will, "use information sharing to enable effective 
and agile decision making through visible, accessible, understandable and trusted data 
and services - when and where needed."  In an effort to improve its information sharing 
capabilities, DoD has adopted KM as a practice to help establish a better information 
sharing environment.  KM can be seen as an important part of the transformation DoD is 
making towards harnessing the power of information superiority stating that, "a KM 
capability can further advance information sharing" (DoD IM/IT Strategic Plan, 
2008/2009).  Maule (2006) states that, "knowledge management is a serious area of 
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inquiry in the military…given the life-threatening situations modern warriors confront 
and the new types of behaviors exhibited in conflict, knowledge systems have become a 
priority area."  This is evident by the number of KM initiatives taken on by organizations 
throughout DoD today.  In terms of goals for KM, the military and private sectors share 
similar interest such as improved decision making, interorganizational communication, 
cooperation, interaction among team members, cognitive understanding, knowledge 
capture and knowledge fusion. Therefore, this research uses the amount of content 
discovered that displays tools and techniques for accomplishing the above listed goals, 
along with language specific to KM importance used by each of the four branches of 
service in order to determine the perceived importance of KM to each service. 
1.     Air Force 
The Air Force seems to perceive KM as important.  As listed on the Air Force 
portal, "IM interacts with Air Force knowledge management programs by providing 
control over the items employed and produced by knowledge-based management 
activities" (https://www.my.af.mil/faf/FAF/fafHome.jsp).  The Air Force Center of 
Excellence for KM lists the following KM goals: 
Decision Quality Information 
Provide Airmen and Commanders with access to the intellectual capital 
necessary to make timely, informed decisions required to achieve desired 
effects and to sustain the momentum of battle  
Transform Military Functions 
Institutionalize knowledge creating collaborative policies, processes, and 
capabilities ensuring tacit knowledge flow, innovative warfighting 
strategies, concepts, and priorities 
Retain “Corporate” Skills 
Connect people-to-people, to enable tacit and explicit knowledge sharing, 
learning, integration, and knowledge transfer critical to Air Force 
knowledge superiority 
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Accelerate Learning Processes 
Develop innovative knowledge practices and capabilities that enable 
Airmen, organization leaders, and Commanders to capitalize on state of 
the art IT infrastructures and tools provided through Knowledge Based 
Operations (AFMC Briefing, 2001) 
Air Force Knowledge Now, the Air Force's organizational KM system, is the 
major program utilized to accomplish the goals of interorganizational communication, 
cooperation, interaction among team members and knowledge capture.  The figure below 
shows how Communities of Practice (CoPs) will be utilized to implement the goals. 
 
Figure 8.   AFKN Build Learning Communities (from AFMC Briefing, 2001) 
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HQ AFMC/A5BK provides expertise in management of information & 
knowledge. Focuses on providing two kinds of services to the Air Force:  
Customized and tailored knowledge management solutions that facilitate 
the execution of mission objectives and strategic goals.  
Consultative assistance in design/implementation of knowledge-centric 
solution sets (AFMC Briefing, 2001) 
2.     Army  
The Army seems to perceive KM as important.  Not only does the Army operate 
the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) portal, but the Army has also has a subordinate 
organization of the U. S. Combined Arms Center (CAC), who, "develops and implements 
knowledge management products and services that support collaboration among Soldiers 
and units" through a KM implementation known as the Battle Command Knowledge 
System (BCKS) (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/bcks/Intro.asp).  Specific objectives listed 
for BCKS are: 
Enable Battle Command — Support virtual collaboration to facilitate the 
timely exchange of knowledge to enhance situational understanding, 
learning and decisionmaking. Assist in unit's preparation for deployment 
by enabling virtual Right Seat Rides (vRSR). 
Enhance Professional Education — Oversee the integration of knowledge 
management practices and expertise to support the establishment of 
collaborative capabilities across the Operational and Institutional Army. 
Facilitate Exchange of Knowledge — Facilitate the establishment and 
operation of online professional forums. Support the implementation of 
secure, standardized knowledge management practices. 
Foster Leader Development — Provide collaborative professional forums 
in order to assist and support the Army's training and education process to 
develop adaptive leaders. Enable sharing of experience and expertise to 
help develop intuitive decisionmaking. 
Support Doctrine Development — Enable collaborative doctrinal 
discussion capabilities. 
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Support Lessons Learned — Provide knowledge management expertise 
and best practices to assist the Center for Army Lessons Learned as it 
collects and shares Observations, Insights and Lessons Learned. 
Support Training — Support the collaborative development of relevant 
online training scenarios based on current combat experiences 
(http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/bcks/Objectives.asp) 
Army Knowledge Management, via its service portal, explicitly states the 
importance of KM to the Army stating, "Operating in an environment of growing 
complexity and uncertainty, today's Soldiers need the ability to rapidly access 
information, transfer knowledge and win the learning competition with 21st century 
adversaries.  The side that learns and adapts the fastest gains important advantages” 
(http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/bcks/WhyKMImportantArmy.asp). The Army even goes a 
step further in clarifying KMs importance to its soldiers by providing the following list of 
expected benefits: 
Reduce the time needed to resolve specific technical or leadership 
problems and challenges. 
Significantly shorten the learning curve by providing access to relevant 
online subject matter experts and mentors. 
Help create innovative/breakthrough ideas and tools for the benefit of all. 
Transfer best practices from one individual to another in near real-time. 
Decrease negative outcomes for first-time real-world contact experiences. 
Reduce the cost of mission accomplishment through superior knowledge 
transfer. 
Fill the knowledge gap between doctrine and TTPs learned at Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools and the practical application in a 
fast changing environment. 
Harness the collective minds of the military profession to generate “on the 
fly” knowledge as needed 
(http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/bcks/WhyKMImportantArmy.asp) 
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3.     Marines  
To date, there is no USMC Knowledge portal that has been fully deployed.  
However, KM is perceived to be important to the Corps, as it is openly practiced by 
several commands.  The institutionalization of KM practices is quite new in the Marine 
Corps.  A recent Marine Corps Order, dated Jan 5, 2010, has been issued which at least 
adopts the Navy's definition of KM, and accepts its practice as an operational function 
that enables organizational learning and improves mission performance.  In its attempt to 
adopt KM practices that support interorganizational communication, cooperation, 
collaboration and knowledge capture the Corps is investing in the development of a 
virtual work environment and organizing CoPs to encourage and facilitate knowledge 
sharing.  To this end CoPs are expected to contribute by providing support through three 
focus areas: 
Collaboration 
Identification of best practices 
Support community for deployment issues 
 
Education 





Recognition of CoP practitioners 
Standardized approaches 
Command-wide resources (MCCDC KM CoP Briefing, 2010) 
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Microsoft (MS) SharePoint is the chosen technological agent that is driving this 
collaboration effort.  Figure 9 depicts the importance of this effort to the Marine Corps as 
it illustrates the aggressive timeline for implementation of this KM initiative. 
 
Figure 9.   USMC Way Ahead (from 
https://ehqmc.usmc.mil/org/mccdc/kmcop/default.aspx, 2010) 
4.     Navy 
The Navy seems to perceive KM as important.  The Navy Knowledge Online 
(NKO) portal is the technology hub that integrates all of the Navy's KM initiatives.  
Offering a more concise explanation of the DON CIO KM Strategy, via the NKO portal, 
the DON CIO website publishes the following statement,  
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The DON CIO promotes and assists in advancing knowledge management 
implementation within the Department, which involves supporting and 
promoting a community of practice, conducting semi-annual meetings and 
providing tools to facilitate learning organizations 
(http://www.DoNcio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?ID=633).   
Resources abound on the NKO portal; specifically organizing varying 
Communities of Interest (COIs) into Knowledge Centers.  The importance of KM to the 
Navy is stressed in its two focus areas of implementation:  1) KM Advocacy, in which 
the DON remains committed to enabling mission accomplishment through KM efforts; 
and 2) Training and Education, where the Navy is providing organization wide training 
such as the Afloat Knowledge Management Course, The Command Knowledge 
Management Course, a two course series on knowledge management through the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Navy E-learning via the NKO portal.  Additional instruction on 
KM principles are being incorporated into all levels of formal education discussing topics 
like CoPs, KM Collaboration, KM Integration and Related Initiatives, and KM 
Technology tools. 
Nissen (2006) states that, "Knowledge management involves organizational 
change."  In concert with the DoD IM/IT Strategic Plan of (2008-2009) in which the 
objectives of KM are to 1) create a knowledge sharing environment; and 2) "Apply 
knowledge sharing (e.g., lessons learned) during the planning of joint experiments, 
operational concept development, combat operations and other missions," each of the 
services is successfully implementing KM to enhance organizational change efforts.  In 
the following section we see examples of lessons learned, case experiences, and practical 
KM solutions at the organization and unit levels, further emphasizing the importance of 
KM to DoD. 
C.     WHO HAS DEVELOPED KM PROGRAMS WITHIN DOD? 
The following table summarizes examples of organization and unit level KM 
initiatives actively being implemented throughout DoD, as well as components of each 
program that contributes to the development of knowledge sharing environments. 
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Table 5.   DoD KM Initiatives 
As we can see, there is much evidence to support the notion that DoD is in 
concert with the success indicators mentioned in table 5 above, namely: 1) growth in 
resources attached to projects, and 2) growth in the volume and content of usage.  
Likewise, we see that critical success factor two is achieved in that, the boasting of 
knowledge and learning portals for each service shows their commitment towards 
building a technical and organizational infrastructure.  The evidence shows that the 
practice of KM has continuously evolved throughout the DoD.  The Marine Corps is 
relatively new in its endeavor when compared with the other branches.  In terms of KM, 
the Navy has touted terms such as "actionable information and knowledge" and 
"knowledge superiority" dating back to its Transformational strategy of 2003.  The Air 
Force and Army however have laid out a timeline of their KM efforts on their respective 
portals.  A summary of these timelines can be seen in the following table, further 
elucidating the fact that KM has indeed evolved throughout DoD. 
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Table 6.   DoD KM Evolution 
D.     WHAT CONSTITUTES SUCCESSFUL KM PROGRAMS? 
In Chapter III, the proposition was made that the civilian sector and the DoD 
community is replete with examples of successful KM initiatives.  Through review of 
each of the service's KM doctrines, strategies, and Web and knowledge portals we come 
to see that overwhelmingly, each branch of service's KM methodologies and practices are 
deeply rooted in widely accepted KM theory, as well as being developed and 
implemented according to industry KM best practices.  While it is nice to view timelines 
to get a snap shot of KM accomplishments, this research seeks to address KM success on 
what it is enabling, rather than what it has accomplished.  In a 2009 Federal Computer 
Weekly article, Robert Nielson, a knowledge management advisor at the office of the 
Army CIO, was quoted as saying,  
"If you think you’ve [succeeded in knowledge management], you aren’t doing 
knowledge management" (http://fcw.com/articles/2009/10/16/dod-knowledge-
management.aspx).   
Perhaps a more appropriate tool of measuring KM success is to measure its 
maturity.  In a recent article in the Electronic Journal of KM, Minonne and Turner (2009) 
assert that a KM program's degree of progression can be explained via a two-dimensional 
model in which the level of implementation is dependent, thereby occupying the y-axis, 
on the information provided by the control system, which will be reported on the x-axis. 
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The authors argue that organizations should be forward thinking in their KM strategies 
and thus when planning and strategizing, their picture of the future should be constantly 
changing and not static.  This is why implementations are dependent of the control 
system, and why the control system should be measuring current performance.  In 
essence, successful KM programs should be measured by assessing the level of maturity 
in implementing the organizations KM strategy.  Table 7 depicts this assessment, as it is 
observed over five stages ranging from no control to full control being established. 
 
Table 7.   Stages of Implementation and Control Security (from Minonne and Turner, 2009) 
Below we give our assessment of the maturity of the overall KM initiatives of 
each branch of service in relation to the table above. 
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1.     Air Force 
The maturity Air Force KM is rated at a 5.  The basics of KM are taught through 
the Air Force Knowledge Now system via the Air Force Portal.  The courses go into great 
detail explaining not only the differences between data, information and knowledge, but 
they also discuss benefits that come by using KM.  Advanced levels of cultural 
integration has been achieved as evidenced by the more than 7000 CoPs that have been 
formed and managed by AFKN, one of which is also an after action CoP, which collects 
and makes available quarterly newsletters and reports from around the Air Force.  
Organizational integration appears to be at an advanced level as the Air Force Materiel 
Command is committed to management of the Air Force's knowledge base as it, 
"Increases access, collaboration and use of content in existing knowledge, information 
and data repositories integrated with increased access to the experience, expertise and 
practices of the Total Force (active, reserve, guard and civilian)" (Air Force KMCPI 
Brief, 2001).  In terms of methodical integration, the Air Force is quality and productivity 
of knowledge workers is enhanced through pragmatic document management, as well as 
the holding of AFKN workshops to assists units throughout the Air Force meet their KM 
objectives.  The procedural integration of the Air Force is phenomenal.  KM is being 
integrated into business processes and organizational workflows, thereby lessening 
rework and reducing process time.  The catalyst for this procedural integration is the 
conceptual implementation of the Knowledge-Centric Organization (KCO). 
2.     Army 
The maturity of Army KM is rated at 5.  The basics of KM are certainly covered 
via the numerous educational briefs and courses conducted by the Army.  Through the 
BCKS an advanced level of cultural and organizational integration has been reached.  
Culturally, the Army highly encourages the exchange of organizational knowledge as can 
be evidenced by facilitating collaboration via the BCKS knowledge portals, professional 
forums, and the capturing, codifying, and redistribution of knowledge performed by the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).  Organizational integration has been achieved 
as BCKS operates a robust content management program.  This practice of content 
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management shows the commitment of the army to the dedicated management of its 
knowledge base as content managers go about producing content maps while determining 
appropriate classifications of content being managed.  Methodical integration, which 
seeks to "integrate human and system oriented KM practices into knowledge intensive 
work processes in such a way as to positively influence organizational performance in 
terms of quality, productivity, and innovation gains" is probably best demonstrated by 
Army KM in its practice of both codification and personalization strategies with such 
programs as its knowledge assessments and mentoring via BCKS with digital storytelling 
(Minonne and Turner, 2009).  In terms of procedural integration, KM has become an 
integral part of workflows and Army KM continues to reduce process time and rework by 
adopting practices like, "Make, Take, Integrate, and Sustain," where AKO integration and 
liaison teams make templates to help identify knowledge gaps, take the templates to the 
unit and demonstrate its usefulness, integrate knowledge requirements to close 
knowledge gaps, and sustain the solution by providing reach-back support and full or 
part-time knowledge management advisors to the unit 
(http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/bcks/BlendedSolutions.asp). 
3.     Marines 
The maturity of USMC KM is rated at 2.  Despite the unit level successes on KM 
implementation, maturity is based upon the ability of the organization (enterprise) to 
operationally define KM, produce doctrine, create and implement strategy, and facilitate 
organizational knowledge creation, storage, sharing, and reuse.  The difference between 
KM and IM is understood by some within the organization, as can be referenced by the 
latest Marine Corps Order on CIO roles and responsibilities.  An intermediate level of 
cultural integration can be evidenced by the newly formed MCCDC KM CoP, as well as 
the virtual workspace that supports knowledge sharing and collaboration via their 
SharePoint interface.  Organizational, methodical, and procedural integration efforts are 
all at low levels and in their infancy, in terms of stages of development. 
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4.     Navy 
The maturity of Navy KM is rated at 5.  With its widespread teachings on the 
benefits of KM to the organization, cultural integration has most certainly been achieved 
as the Navy equips its people for the organization change necessary for KM success.  
This endeavor is most notable in the Navy's effort to teach KM principles at all levels of 
professional training.  Organizational integration has been achieved as evidenced by the 
commitment of managing the organizational knowledge base with NKO and also with the 
Navy Personnel Development Command (NPDC).  Evidence of methodical integration 
seem to be at an advanced level as quality and productivity of KM efforts are constantly 
evaluated with metrics analysis, ensuring metrics are tied to objectives of their KM 
processes, and also through content and document management, as well as with 
mentoring through KM scenarios and procedures such as classroom storytelling, 
discussion boards, and conferences.  Procedural integration also seems to be at an 
advanced level.  KM implementations by numerous Naval commands to include the 
Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), NPDC, Navy Medicine Manpower, 
Personnel, Training & Education Command (NAVMED MPT&E), Navy Installations 
Command, and US Pacific Fleet, all of which have a robust KM strategy, attribute to the 
realization that KM has been integrated into business processes throughout the Navy. 
This study's assessment of KM programs across the DoD is that the Air Force, 
Army and Navy are all successfully implementing KM at advanced levels.  The Marine 
Corps has plenty of unit level KM successes, however, organizationally, KM is not very 
mature.  In regards to the levels of control, we posit that KM control has been fully 
established in the Air Force, Army and Navy, in that four compulsory elements of "a 
predetermined set of targets, a means of measuring current activity, a means of 
comparing current activity with each target, and a means of correcting deviations from 
the targets" to ensure that implementation of KM strategy measures current performance 
and "guides the organization toward its changing image of the futures" in terms of KM 
(Minonne and Turner, 2009). 
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E.     WHAT METRICS ARE BEING USED TO EVALUATE KM PROGRAMS? 
Organizations should measure what matters. Measuring for the sake of 
measuring is fruitless and a waste of time. It is important that measures 
and metrics be developed and collected for the purpose of continuous 
improvement of knowledge management activities. (APQC, 2003) One 
method is to collect stories that explain metrics. For example – telling a 
story of how KM improved organizational efficiency by explaining how 
metrics were developed, collected and analyzed is extremely valuable. 
After data is collected, it is important to post the results and analyze them. 
When we can show leaders and employees that KM Initiatives produced 
results, this will result in greater buy-in to using those initiatives. (Hoss 
and Schlussel, 2009) 
Inevitably, KM has to be measured to show senior leadership what the results are.  
It is quite common to equate Return on Investment (ROI), in a monetary sense, to KM 
initiatives in industry; however, results from a military perspective differ in than DoD is 
not a traditional profit-making organization.  With metrics, it cannot be approached with 
a one size fits all mentality.  There are metrics that are not useful.  In military terms, 
funding lines are tied to performance and efficiency, hence, giving the military 
commander the ability to prioritize funding to KM initiatives that work, as opposed to 
those that are stagnate or ineffective.  Each branch appears to have studied this 
phenomenon and list metrics that they find appropriate for their KM initiatives. 
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1.     Air Force 
 
Figure 10.   AFKN Metrics (from 
https://www.my.af.mil/afknprod/asps/Metrics/Entry.asp?Filter=OO, 2010) 
2.     Army 
The Army states that, "The most important characteristic of a KM metric is 
whether it can tell how effectively the knowledge is contributing to understanding and 
decision-making. A secondary one is whether knowledge is being shared or used." (Army 
FM 6-01.1 Knowledge Management Section, 2008)  To this end, the most common 
metrics utilized by the Army are: 1) System metrics (page visits, contributions, number of 
visits); 2) Output metrics (replies to discussions, documents downloaded and used); and 
3) Outcome metrics (time/money saved, injuries prevented, changes in the way we do 
business) (Hoss and Schlussel, 2009).  In addition to these metrics, the Army also 
measures the maturity of it KM programs as evidenced by the figure below. 
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Table 8.   AKM Maturity Indicator (from Hoss and Schlussel, 2009) 
3.     Marines 
As discussed earlier, the Marine Corps' KM effort is very new.  To date, no 
documents could be found through its information and knowledge portals to confirm 
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current metrics usage.  Site usage and visitor counts were the only visible metrics being 
utilized on current USMC KM portals.  Therefore, this research admits to not finding 
sufficient evidence to confirm the status of current USMC KM metrics gathering. 
4.     Navy 
 
Table 9.   DON KM Metrics (from DON KM Metrics Guide, 2001) 
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F.     HOW CAN THE USMC KM PRACTICE BE IMPROVED? 
To date, the Marine Corps has established a command to take operational control 
of KM implementation.  A definition, albeit the same one used by the DON, of KM has 
been organizationally defined.  KM is perceived to be important to the Corps, as it is 
openly practiced by several commands.  In addition to its development of a virtual work 
environment, the Marine Corps seems to be adopting a similar methodology of 
implementing KM through CoPs to facilitate knowledge sharing.  Advances in KM 
education efforts throughout the organization are needed.  A USMC KM Strategy must 
be developed and disseminated, separate of that issued by the DON CIO.  An actionable 
KM Framework must be developed that will help to articulate the knowledge vision of 
the Marine Corps and further develop its knowledge base in concert with its operational 









This research set out to summarize findings of KM best practices, responsible for 
healthy organizational knowledge flow throughout DoD, and identify knowledge flow 
pathologies regarding how the USMC is currently addressing KM and how they can 
overcome these knowledge flow issues and advance its KM practice.  Additionally, we 
delineate knowledge flow vectors in this chapter that help to describe the current state of 
DoD knowledge and workflow processes along with potential interventions that may 
assist with improving the learning and doing of USMC knowledge workers.  Ultimately, 
these findings are used to develop a KM framework to be utilized by current USMC 
information management workers to assist with KM advancement and practices 
throughout the Marine Corps.  Specifically, we want to answer the two research questions 
presented in Chapter I: 
1. How is the DoD currently addressing KM? 
2. What steps are necessary for the Marine Corps to advance its KM 
practice? 
A. KEY RESULTS AND INSIGHTS  
Table 10 summarizes the DoD KM practices discovered by this research.  There is 
no attempt to order or rank the services in terms of KM practice, but merely represent the 
findings. 
 
Table 10.   DoD KM Findings 
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As previously stated in Chapter IV, we find that the KM practices for the Air 
Force, Army and Navy are rated at being mature.  The current posture of KM practices in 
these three branches of service did not occur overnight, or by a lack of leadership.  Nissen 
states, "Knowledge exhibits some properties of inertia such as tendency to remain at rest, 
hence knowledge-flow processes represent direct focuses of leadership and managerial 
action (Nissen, 2006).  Each of the three branches previously mentioned exhibits direct 
focus from their leadership, as can be evidenced by the listing of the indicators and 
factors of success found in their respective KM programs.  These indicators and factors 
are largely representative of knowledge-flow processes and activities that, along with the 
appropriate KM principles, senior leadership as well as KM practitioners, are actively 
figuring out how to successfully weave into the cultures and operational practices of their 
services.  The research conducted through this study finds that the Air Force, Army and 
Navy, with their mature KM programs, implementations and practices have reached what 
we call a Virtuous KM Spiral.  The notion is that each organization is able to "maintain 
an upward spiral of higher and higher performance" as a result of continuous strategizing, 
value-creation and development of KM implementations that work (Lawler III and 
Worley, 2006).  Figure 11 helps to delineate this spiral. 
 
Figure 11.   Virtuous KM Spiral 
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Coordinate A signifies the point an individual creates tacit knowledge.  Vector 
(A→B) represents the individual's conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge 
(articulation) and transferring it to the group level for sharing.  Nissen (2006) describes 
knowledge as being "sticky," therefore clumping to an individual and being hard to 
move.  This characteristic of tacit knowledge is shown in terms of long flow time as 
represented by the bold vector.  While little can be DoNe to help speed the process of 
knowledge internalization (the conversion of explicit to tacit knowledge), the Air Force, 
Army and Navy have invested in attempts at helping the individual facilitate the 
knowledge conversion process associated with knowledge externalization (tacit to 
explicit).   
The Air Force's Innovative Development Through Employee Awareness (IDEA) 
Program encourages the creation and submission of new ideas (innovation) that promote 
process improvement.  All DoD military, civilian employee(s) or contract personnel are 
provided an electronic medium, the IDEA Program Data System (IPDS), which helps to 
facilitate the articulation process of converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge via 
a Web-based Air Force application.  The Army uses digital storytelling to help facilitate 
knowledge creation and sharing, which we see as another means of inducing knowledge 
conversion.  While digital storytelling is not completely explicit, as the story remains 
tacit in form, the narrative engineering platform offered through BCKS allows the story 
to be recorded (made explicit) if necessary, and further disseminated to allow for sharing 
within the group.  The Navy implements what is known as classroom storytelling, in 
which tacit knowledge of students is captured, and sent to Distance Support for 
validation, by instructors because the instructor feels that the details will provide 
substantial value to operational readiness.  Once the articulated knowledge has been 
vetted and validated by Distance Support, the Navy allows instructors to disseminate the 
newly validated knowledge (now explicit in nature) throughout its courses of instruction, 
allowing groups of students, as well as future shipmates to share this knowledge.   
Vectors (B→C) and (C→D) represent the "movement of explicit knowledge 
across the reach dimension" (Nissen, 2006).  This movement is happening at a rapid rate 
as depicted with a narrow vector representative of its short flow time.  The major 
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practices identified throughout this study that facilitate the swift flow of movement is 1) 
associated with the explicit nature of the knowledge being transferred, as explicit 
knowledge is characteristic of being supported well by IT; and 2) the use of CoPs.  The 
CoP strategies being implemented by the Air Force, Army and Navy enable timely 
exchanges of knowledge through virtual collaboration, support communities, 
collaborative workspaces and most importantly, anytime-anywhere access to knowledge 
assets.   
Vector (D→E) represents a movement down the organization's life cycle of 
knowledge.  Traditionally, the formalization of processes and procedures in DoD happens 
as the result of a lengthy process of doctrinal publication writing.  However, the use of 
CoPs and social media tools such as wikis has allowed the organization to formalize 
processes at a much more rapid rate.  Because CoPs are formed of subject matter experts 
in their respective domains, it allows the organization to accept the knowledge shared and 
created as recognizable and legitimate.  Hence, because the information and knowledge 
developed in these CoPs is accepted as operationally relevant, the organizations are able 
to move swiftly from knowledge formalization to sharing throughout the organization, 
largely due to the fact that the need for the organization to organize the knowledge has 
already been taken care of at the group level.  Again, this flow is represented as short 
flow time with the narrow vector.   
Vector (E→F) depicts the movement from explicit organizational knowledge 
being shared to explicit group knowledge being applied, which again represents strength 
of the CoP approach, as the organization’s knowledge base continues to grow and sustain 
itself.  Vector (F→G) shows the important movement to knowledge refinement 
(internalization).  The process of converting explicit knowledge to its tacit form happens 
at the individual level, thus represented by a slow flow time with a bold vector.  
However, even with this slow individual-based cognitive process, the extensive use of 
CoPs in the Air Force, Army and Navy helps these branches of service to benefit from 
the collective internalization of individuals understanding throughout the organization, 
thus learning and applying important KM principles and practices.  Lastly, vector (G→A) 
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represents a movement back to the individual who has been empowered and incentivized 
to create new knowledge, which completes the Virtuous KM Spiral.  
"Knowledge is not a single, static, monolithic concept.  Rather it is multifaceted, 
dynamic, and multidimensional. Hence, managerial efficacy through intervention can be 
increased by learning the principles of dynamic knowledge (Nissen, 2006).  Summarizing 
our assessment of the three aforementioned services, the Air Force, Army and Navy are 
doing an exceptional job of promoting knowledge sharing, connecting those who need to 
know with those who know, creating and sustaining operational knowledge bases and 
appropriately weaving KM principles into their organization's knowledge and workflow 
processes.  The Marine Corps, among other organizations, stands much to gain by 
applying the cross section of KM practices observed in its sister services. 
Recommendations for how to proceed are provided below. 
B.     RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapter II, we asserted that KM is the practice of managing intellectual capital.  
Closely related to this is the discipline of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) which 
promotes the managing of change.  Any successful KM effort should be expected to 
blend the complications of managing complex changes in people's behaviors, as well as 
organizational processes.  In reviewing BPR research conducted by Bashein, Markus and 
Riley (1994), which is centered on preconditions for success, we feel these preconditions 
are also applicable to KM success.  The research of Bashein, Markus and Riley (1994) 
provides eight preconditions, and Nissen (2006) suggests that three of them are most 
prevalent today.  Nissen summarizes, "through research on numerous re-engineering 
projects, three obstacles to large-scale change are noted: (1) lack of sustained 
management commitment and leadership; (2) unrealistic scope and expectations; and (3) 
resistance to change.  Examine any KM project today, and you are very likely to 
encounter these same obstacles" (Nissen, 2006).  Armed with this knowledge, the Marine 
Corps cannot continue to practice KM with the single approach of enhancing knowledge 
sharing without addressing the issue of its stagnant knowledge sharing culture.  Dual  
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emphasis must be placed on organizational change and enhanced knowledge sharing 
through KM, as both are likely necessary to reach advanced levels of KM maturity in the 
Marine Corps.    
Deeply rooted in the review of KM literature, and coupled with thorough analysis 
of successful KM best practices throughout DoD, we present the Create, Craft, Choose, 
Promote and Organize (C-3PO) Framework.  The framework encompasses the tenets of 
successful change management, along with KM best practices and activities most likely 
to bring maturity to current USMC KM practices. 
 
Figure 12.   C-3PO KM Framework 
1.     Create a Vision 
"Realistic expectations, shared vision, and appropriate people participating full-
time represent the preconditions for success that are absent or insufficient most often in 
KM projects." (Nissen, 2006)  This research has found that a vision for KM in the Marine 
Corps is non-existent.  Recall earlier when it was implied that knowledge possesses 
inertia and that managerial action is necessary to effectively move it.  Vision can serve as 
the impetus that will promote, and likely induce the behavioral changes desired for 
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USMC KM workers to be committed to implement the KM vision.  With the 
development of a USMC KM Vision statement, a KM leader emerges for the Marine 
Corps that will set the tone for KM implementation throughout the organization, as well 
as those KM workers committed to making the vision a reality.  At the time of this 
research the position of Director of KM Integration remains vacant.  In creating this KM 
vision, the Marine Corps must also ensure that the KM mission aligns with the mission of 
the Marine Corps, further complementing the Corp's ability to reap desired KM benefits.  
Finally, a KM vision addresses the issues associated with unrealistic expectations, as the 
vision can be expected to draw a clear timeline for measuring immediate and future KM 
successes against.  We have already seen a timeline for KM implementation for the 
Marine Corps, however without vision to measure it against, those implementing KM can 
easily lose focus, direction and motivation when either missing deadlines or reaching 
barriers to success.  
2.     Craft a Strategy 
The Marine Corps is no different than any other organization, in that its members 
share and acquire the knowledge they need to perform their jobs most often in one of two 
ways: 1) accessing documents; or 2) accessing people.  The most appropriate KM 
strategy for the Marine Corps to adopt is that of a personalization/codification hybrid.  
Heeding the warning given by Ribiere and Roman (2006), stating that organizations 
trying to excel at both risk failing at both, the Marine Corp's hybrid approach can be on a 
situational basis, according to the needs of KM for a particular part of the organization.  
Hence, those seeking to "collect, codify, and disseminate" information and knowledge 
should pursue codification KM strategies primarily.  Whereas, those seeking to develop 
networks and link people together for the purposes of tacit knowledge flow should pursue 
personalization KM strategies principally.  It is understood that the Marine Corps as an 
organization must address both strategies in order to develop both an infrastructure and 
techno structure necessary to support organization-wide KM, as well as unit-level KM.  
In doing so, as long as the appropriate organizational processes are targeted, via a well 
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structured strategy, the Marine Corps can expect to reap bountiful KM benefits by 
optimally organizing and utilizing its available resources for KM. 
Crafting a KM strategy for the Marine Corps should naturally evolve into 
producing a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with which the Marine Corps can 
articulate the understanding of its knowledge gaps and the scope with which its KM 
efforts will target improvements.  Another benefit of providing this KM CONOPS is the 
communication of KM goals and objectives desperately needed to drive the KM effort.  
Additionally, a KM CONOPS should be expected to provide guidance to subordinate 
leaders throughout the Corps as it delineates very clear delegations of responsibility.  
Nissen warns that, "reliance upon external expertise, narrow technical focus, and 
animosity towards staff and specialists represent the preconditions for failure that are 
present or sufficient most often in KM projects" (Nissen, 2006).  If the Marine Corps 
doesn't develop a KM strategy and CONOPS to drive implementation, it certainly 
jeopardizes its own success at KM, as the Corps does not have the in-house KM 
expertise, and at best is currently employing technology to service its knowledge workers 
that is narrow in focus, likely being utilized to meet today's needs, but lacks any focus on 
how it may contribute to future KM needs. 
3.     Choose KM Activities 
"Perhaps the greatest potential in terms of a knowledge audit lies in the prospect 
of measuring knowledge inventory." (Nissen, 2006)  The value of a knowledge audit 
cannot be understated, as it is likely the best way to help an organization learn what it is 
they truly know, or do not know.  Conducting a knowledge audit is also beneficial in 
discovering knowledge gaps, which would be beneficial in USMC KM, as it would 
increase the chances of the Corps to get the necessary knowledge to those who need it.   
Choosing KM activities wisely is another means of managing KM resources 
appropriately.  A myriad of KM activities being practiced through DoD was addressed in 
this research.  Examples include how the Air Force is developing innovative knowledge 
practices and capabilities through its "IDEA" program, how the Army is assisting state-
side units preparing for future combat deployments with its "Virtual Right Seat Rides" 
 65
program, and how the Navy is educating its sailors through its Afloat Knowledge 
Management Course, which brings the education to its deployed personnel, thereby 
closing a knowledge gap, and developing KM capabilities throughout Naval commands.  
The largest similarity among all the previously mentioned KM activities is that they are 
all tied to advanced and mature organization-led knowledge portals, giving members 
anytime/anywhere access.  This capability does not currently exist in the Marine Corps.  
The Marine Corps must develop an online knowledge portal in order to advance its KM 
posture.  At best with SharePoint, the USMC KM capability is being limited to those 
units that are utilizing the product to share knowledge at the intra-unit level.  For USMC 
KM to be effective knowledge sharing must exist throughout the organization, and a 
knowledge portal that gives access to all Marines, while simultaneously supporting 
working groups, CoPs, and other communities of interest, will help to induce the flow of 
knowledge at all levels of command. 
The Marine Corps would also benefit from following in the footsteps of the Navy 
in conducting a strength-weakness-opportunity-threat (SWOT) analysis in order to, 
"recognize deficiencies in the organization's knowledge position, as well as knowledge 
strengths that can be leveraged" (Holsapple and Jones, 2006).  The major advantage in 
performing a SWOT analysis for the Marine Corps is that it allows the Corps to tailor its 
KM efforts to match the unique capabilities provided by the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF), which is the official organization of how Marines conduct missions 
across the range of military operations.  It is further believed that if the Corps is aware of 
competitive advantages that exist as a result of its knowledge position, knowledge 
workers can best be supported with the creation of KM tool kits, providing knowledge 
workers with a standardized, yet flexible way of implementing KM at the unit level.  
These KM tool kits would contain KM education for leaders interested in pursuing KM 
efforts, along with supporting technological tools and training to begin KM 
implementation for the Corps' most common knowledge-intensive processes. 
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4.     Promote Knowledge Sharing  
Across the board, CoPs are being utilized as the KM methodology of choice 
across the DoD.  The Marine Corps is currently forming its first KM CoP, and should 
continue to pursue and encourage this practice.  Benefits gained from utilizing CoPs are 
mostly associated with increases in social capital.  "Culture, trust, and incentives affect 
organizational learning, hence, performance as much as process, technology, and training 
do" (Nissen, 2006).  CoP utilization offers the Corps the best opportunity of leveraging 
the benefits of formal and informal means of socialization and human interaction.  In 
other words, it is difficult to promote knowledge sharing in an environment where people 
do not feel trusted and empowered.  Being able to meet in a community of individuals 
with similar goals and pursuits helps to alleviate trust issues often associated with not 
wanting to reveal a lack of knowledge around senior leaders.  Additionally, the Corps 
must improve at recognizing efforts undertaken by knowledge workers.  The Air Force, 
Army and Navy are replete with examples of KM awards that are disseminated 
throughout their organizations.  Finally, as with systems in the past, the Marine Corps has 
to be careful to not only bolster efforts at knowledge sharing in garrison commands, as 
often times it is the individuals or groups operationally deployed, without a means to 
reach back for support, who are in need of collaboration tools.    In this regard, KM 
collaboration tools funded and appropriated should be planned for usage by garrison 
commands, as well as those units beyond the wire. 
5.     Organize KM Processes Around Strategy 
The goal of improving the posture of USMC KM practice must transcend beyond 
simply being able to state that the Marine Corps is doing KM.  The ultimate goal must be 
measured in terms of facilitated knowledge transfers, increasing knowledge bases, and 
the retention and development of intellectual capital.  To ensure that USMC KM is 
accomplishing this, there needs to be a constant assessment of what USMC KM 
processes are achieving.  The KM processes must be organized around the KM strategy.  
To ensure that KM leaders do not lose sight of this, KM processes involving both forms 
of knowledge (explicit and tacit) must be examined in relation to the KM strategies being 
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pursued.  With the Marine Corps seemingly moving forward with KM activities, as it 
should, leadership should be cautioned not to put the cart before the horse with the 
purchasing of promising technologies, and formalization of KM practices not vetted 
against a viable KM strategy.  Ultimately the strategy must provide the basis for which 
technologies and practices of USMC KM processes will be organized around. 
C.     SUGGESTIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
This research has provided a summary of realized DoD KM best practices, as well 
as formulation of a framework that the Marine Corps can utilize to bolster its KM efforts 
and close the gap of KM practice between its sister services.  This research does not 
claim completeness in either realized best practices or its culmination of an actionable 
KM framework.  Follow-on research could include more quantitative methods of 
identifying DoD KM best practices through the use of surveys to the entire population of 
DoD KM practitioners. 
Further research could be conducted on the development of specific KM tools 
used to promote collaboration and knowledge sharing through social media among deployed 
USMC knowledge workers.  Nissen (2006) believes that socialization and acculturation are 
viable approaches towards enhancing knowledge flows.  Knowledge flows that are facilitated 
by social media offer promise in bridging the dynamics involved with KM and social 
networks. 
Finally, this research only focused on KM initiatives among the Air Force, Army, 
Marines and Navy, and did not include any analysis of KM initiatives in the Joint and 
Coalition arenas, non-military government institutions or business organizations.  
Considering the net-centric environment of today's military and the ever expanding number 
of joint missions, a thorough analysis of joint KM initiatives may provide insight into ways 
of expanding KM practice throughout the DoD. Moreover, given the increasingly tight 
integration of military, government, corporate and non-profit organizations in coalition 
operations, looking beyond the military is prudent as well. It is important, nonetheless, to 
understand that the Marine Corps is different in many respects—and similar in other 
respects—from other organizations. Hence USMC KM vision, strategy and 
implementation will likely reflect a mix of unique and common elements. 
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